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Abstract
This paper examines an economy with a large number of industries,
each producing a different good. Technological change follows a Pois-
son process where firms improve their productivity through investment
in R&D. The less there are firms in the economy or the more they can
coordinate their actions, the higher their profits. Labor is used in pro-
duction or R&D. All workers are unionized and their wages depend
on relative union bargaining power. If this power is high enough, then
there is involuntary unemployment. Both workers and firms lobby
the central planner of the economy which affects firms’ and unions’
market power. The main findings of the paper can be summarized
the follows. The central planner can increase its welfare either (a) by
increasing the level of income or (b) by speeding up economic growth.
If (a) is more effective than (b), then the central planner eliminates
union power altogether to have full employment. On the other hand,
if (b) is more effective than (a), then the central planner supports
labor unions to promote cost-escaping R&D.
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1 Introduction
I consider an economy with a fixed number J of similar industries.1 Each
industry possesses a fixed amount L of labor, a representative firm and a
representative labor union. To examine the political economy of growth and
economic integration, the model is composed as follows:
(i) Firms produce one unit of output from one labor unit. The prices are
determined by oligopolistic competition.
(ii) Workers and firms bargain over wages.
(iii) Firms invest in R&D to escape production costs.
(iv) The decision maker of the economy, called the central planner, has its
own interests and regulates the product and labor markets. The interest
groups that represent workers and firms lobby the central planner.
I summarize the institutional structure of the model as:
Representatives Representatives
Agents in wage bargaining in lobbying the
central planner
Workers Labor unions Worker lobby
Firms Employer federation Employer lobby
I use the common agency model (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston (1986),
Grossman and Helpman (1994a), and Dixit at al. (1997) to establish a po-
litical equilibrium with the following sequence of decisions:
1. Worker and employer lobbies make their offers to the central planner.
These offers relate the lobbies’ prospective political contributions to
the central planner’s policy.
2. The central planner regulates the product and labor markets. Product
market regulation determines how much firms can coordinate their ac-
tions in price settlement, and labor market regulation determines the
relative power of the labor unions in wage bargaining.
1The assumption on similar industries is admittedly strong, but with asymmetric in-
dustries there is no analytical result in the model.
2
3. Unions and employers bargain over the wages.
4. Firms decide how much to invest in R&D.
5. Each firm decides on its output given its expectations on the behavior of
the other firms.
6. The households decide on their consumption.
This extended game is solved by backward induction.
2 Production and consumption
In industry j ∈ {1, ..., J}, a single firm (hereafter firm j) produces good j
from labor with technology
yj = Bjnj, (1)
where yj output, nj labor input in production and Bj is the productivity
parameter. I assume that all products j ∈ {1, ..., J} are perfect substitutes,
for simplicity.2
All households in the economy share the same preferences and take in-
come, the prices and the interest rate r as given. Thus, they all behave
as if there were a single representative household which chooses its flow of
consumption C to maximize its utility starting at time T ,∫ ∞
T
(log C)e−ρ(θ−T )dθ,
where θ is time, C consumption and ρ > 0 the constant rate of time pref-
erence. The total supply of the composite good, C, is the sum of industrial
outputs yj, C =
∑J
j=1 yj.Noting this, the maximization leads to the Euler
equation [cf. Grossman and Helpman (1994b)]
E˙/E = r − ρ with E .= pC = p
J∑
j=1
yj, (2)
where p the consumption price, E total consumption expenditure, r the inter-
est rate and E˙ = dE/dt. Because in the model there is no money that would
2With some complication, it is possible to use a CES function here for the same purpose.
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pin down the nominal price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize
total consumption expenditure E at the constant number J of industries.
This and (2) yield
E = p = E
/ J∑
j=1
yj = J
/ J∑
j=1
yj, r = ρ > 0. (3)
3 Firms
3.1 Competition in the product market
Following Dixit (1986), I assume that each firm j anticipates the reaction of
the other firms k 6= j by
dyk/dyj = ϕyk/yj for k 6= j, (4)
where ϕ ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the firms’ market power. If ϕ = 0, the firms
behave in Cournot manner, taking each others’ output level as given. The
higher ϕ, the more the firms can coordinate their actions and the higher price
they can charge. The central planner can decrease (increase) ϕ by intensifying
(weakening) its competition and anti-trust policies. The product market is
fully deregulated for ϕ = 0.
I assume, for simplicity, uniform initial productivity in the economy, B0k =
B0 for all k. This implies symmetry yk = y for all k. Noting (3) and (4), the
inverse of the anticipated price elasticity of demand for firm j is then
φ(ϕ)
.
= −
[
yj
p
dp
dyj
]
yk=y
=
[
yj∑J
k=1 yk
d
∑J
k=1 yk
dyj
]
yk=y
= 1
J
[∑J
k=1
dyk
dyj
]
yk=y
= 1
J
[
1 + ϕ
∑
k 6=j
yk
yj
]
yk=y
= (1− ϕ)/J + ϕ.
By controlling ϕ, the central planner can determine φ.
Firm j maximizes its profit pij
.
= pyj − wjnj, where yj is output, by its
labor input nj holding the wage wj and productivity Bj constant, given the
production function (1) and the price elasticity of the demand for output,
(5). Noting (3), this maximization yields the conditions
wj =
[
p+ yj
dp
dyj
]
Bj = (1− φ)pBj = (1−φ)J∑J
j=1 yj
Bj,
pij = pyj − wjnj = pyj − (1− φ)pBjnj = φpyj,
wjnj/pij = 1/φ− 1,
∑J
j=1wjnj = (1− φ)J,
∑J
j=1 pij = φJ.
4
Results (5) show that labor input in production, nj, can be constant, provided
that the wage wj and the profit pij change in the same proportion. Without
this property, there could not be a steady state in the model.
3.2 Research and development (R&D)
Technological change for firm j is characterized by a Poisson process qj as
follows. During a short time interval dθ, there is an innovation dqj = 1 with
probability Λjdθ, and no innovation dqj = 0 with probability 1−Λjdθ, where
Λj is the arrival rate of innovations in the research process. The arrival rate
Λj is an increasing function of labor devoted to R&D, lj,
Λj = λl
1−ν
j , λ > 0, ν ∈ (0, 1), (5)
where λ and ν are constants. Decreasing returns to scale ν ∈ (0, 1) in R&D
are assumed to ensure the existence of equilibrium. Following Horii and
Iwaisako (2007), this can be justified by the possibility of duplication: when
two workers innovate in the same industry, they produce very likely less than
a double amount of innovations.
I denote the serial number of technology in industry j by tj and vari-
ables depending on technology tj by superscript tj. The invention of a new
technology raises tj by one and the level of productivity B
tj
j by a > 1. Hence,
B
tj
j = B
0
j a
tj . (6)
During a short time interval dθ, there is a change in technology from tj to
tj+1 with probability Λjdθ, and no change with probability 1−Λjdθ, where
Λj is (5).
The average growth rate of the level of productivity (6) in the stationary
state is in fixed proportion (λ log a) to l1−νj [cf. Aghion and Howitt (1998),
p. 59] and thereby an increasing function of lj. Thus, research input lj can
be used as a proxy of the growth rate in industry j.
Firm j’s dividends are given by
Πj = pij − wjlj, (7)
where pij is profit, wj the wage in industry j, lj labor devoted to R&D and wjlj
expenditures on R&D. Firm j maximizes the present value of its dividends
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(7) by its investment in R&D, lj, subject to technological change, given the
wage wj. The value of firm j at time T is
Ω(tj, wj, pij) = max
lj s.t. (5), (7)
E
∫ ∞
T
Πje
−r(θ−T )dθ, (8)
where θ is time, E the expectation operator and r the interest rate. In
Appendix A, I show that this optimization leads to the two results:
(i) The ratio of dividends to profits, Πj/pij, is a decreasing function of labor
devoted to R&D, lj as follows:
Πj
pij
= cj = c(lj)
.
=
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
r+(1−a)νλl1−νj
, r + (1− a)λl1−νj > 0,
c′ .= dcj
dlj
=
(ν−1)r(1−cj)cj/lj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
< 0.
This is explained by decreasing returns to scale in R&D.
(ii) The constraint wjnj/pij = 1/φ − 1 in (5) can be transformed into the
form where labor devoted to production, nj, is a decreasing function of
the firms’ share of value added, φ, but total labor input nj + lj is an
increasing function of labor devoted to R&D, lj:
nj = n(lj, φ)
.
= 1/φ−1
1−c(lj) lj,
∂n
∂φ
< 0, nj + lj =
1/φ−c
1−c lj,
∂(nj+lj)
∂lj
=
[
1
φ
− c(lj)
]
ν
c(lj)
1−c(lj) −
c′(lj)lj
1−c(lj) > 0.
4 Wage bargaining
Because each industry j possesses a fixed amount L of labor, its full-employment
constraint is given by
lj + nj ≤ L, (9)
where nj and lj are labor inputs in production and R&D.
In each industry j, the workers’ wage wj is determined by bargaining
between a union representing workers in industry j (hereafter union j) and
a federation representing the employers of these workers (hereafter employer
j). On the assumption that both parties of bargaining are risk neutral, the
problem can be solved as an alternating-offers game. I also assume that the
workers have access to perfect unemployment insurance. This ensures that
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all workers in the same industry behave as if there were only one worker in
that industry.3 I assume, furthermore, that in the case of a dispute there
is no production, and consequently neither labor income nor profits. The
reference income is then zero for both the union and the employer.
In wage bargaining, at each time T , labor union j maximizes the expected
present value of wages,
U(lj, φ)
.
= E
∫ ∞
T
(nj + lj)wje
−r(θ−T )dθ, (10)
and federation j maximizes the expected present value of dividends Πj =
c(lj)pij,
F (lj, φ) = E
∫∞
T
c(lj)pije
−r(θ−T )dθ, (11)
subject to the full-employment constraint (9) and the firms’ behavior as a
producer and an investor. The outcome of this bargaining can be obtained
through maximizing the Generalized Nash Product Uαj F
1−α
j by the wage wj,
where α ∈ [0, 1] is relative union bargaining power. Because α depends on
labor market regulation [cf. Binmore et al. (1986)], I assume that the central
planner uses α as the policy instrument. In Appendix B, the maximization
of the Generalized Nash Product Uαj F
1−α
j yields the following equilibrium
condition. If there is any unemployment, both the relative union bargaining
power α and the firms’ share of valued added, φ, promote R&D and growth:
lj = `(α, φ) for lj + nj < L,
∂`
∂α
> 0, ∂`
∂φ
> 0,
limα→0(L− lj − nj) = 0.
5 The economy
I consider a symmetric equilibrium with B0j = B
0, in which case nj = n,
lj = l, wj = w and pij = pi holds true, In that equilibrium, noting (9) and
(12), the full-employment constraint (9) and the constraint α ≤ 1 can be
written as:
L ≥ l + n(l, φ), `(1, φ) ≥ `(α, φ) = l. (12)
3Otherwise, workers’ income distribution would affect the unions’ behavior and the
general equilibrium of the industry. Because this would excessively complicate the analysis,
I ignore all distributional aspects in this study and leave them for future investigation.
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From (5) and (9) it follows that
wn = 1
J
∑J
j=1wjnj = 1− φ, pi = 1J
∑J
j=1 pij = φ,
(n+ l)w = (1 + l/n)wn = (1− cφ)wn/(1− φ) = 1− c(l)φ.
By (1), (3), (9) and (9), I define the present value of the expected flow of
real income per industry, y, as [cf. Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 61]
Ψ(l, φ)
.
= E
∫∞
T
1
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ = E
∫∞
T
ye−r(θ−T )dθ
= E
∫∞
T
Bne−r(θ−T )dθ = B(T )n
r+(1−a)λl1−ν
=
(
1
φ
− 1)ψ(l), ψ(l) .= B(T )l/[1−c(l)]
r+(1−a)λl1−ν ,
ψ′
ψ
= d logψ
dl
= 1
l
+ c
′
1−c − (1−ν)(1−a)λl
−ν
r+(1−a)λl1−ν >
1
l
+ (ν−1)r/l
r+(1−a)λl1−ν − (1−ν)(1−a)λl
−ν
r+(1−a)λl1−ν
= 1/l + (ν − 1)/l = ν/l > 0,
∂Ψ/∂l = (1/φ− 1)ψ′ > 0.
Holding the firms’ share of value added, φ, constant, a higher level of R&D
(i.e. a bigger l) increases the present value of the expected flow of real income,
Ψ.
The unions and the firms lobby the central planner which decides on
the firms’ market power ϕ and the unions’s relative bargaining power α.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994a), I assume that the central planner
has its own interests and collects contributions Ru and Rf from the union
and employer lobbies. A member of the worker lobby earns wages (n + l)w
minus political contributions Ru. A member of the employer lobby earn
dividends Π minus political contributions Ru. Because the effects through
the the price level p can be internalized at the level of the economy, the
worker lobby maximizes the present value U of the expected flow of a typical
worker’s real income [(n + l)w − Ru]/p, and the employer lobby maximizes
the present value F of the expected flow of a typical firm’s real dividends
(Π− Rf )/p at time T . Noting (9), (12), (13) and (13), these targets can be
defined as:
U
(
`
(
α, φ
)
, φ, Ru
)
= U(l, φ, Ru) .= E
∫∞
T
(n+l)w−Ru
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ
= Ψ[(n+ l)w −Ru] = Ψ(l, φ)[1− c(l)φ−Ru],
F
(
`
(
α, φ
)
, φ, Ru
)
= F(l, φ, Rf ) .= E
∫∞
T
Π−Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ
= Ψ[Π−Rf ] = Ψ[c(l)pi −Rf ] = Ψ(l, φ)[c(l)φ−Rf ],
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where
U(l, φ, Rf ) + F(l, φ, Rf ) = (1−Ru −Rf )Ψ(l, φ). (13)
Noting (13), the present value the expected flow of the real political con-
tributions at time T is given by
E
∫ ∞
T
Ru +Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ = Ψ(l, φ)(Ru +Rf ). (14)
Given this and (13), I specify the central planner’s utility function as follows:
G
(
`
(
α, φ
)
, φ, Ru, Rf
)
= G(l, φ, Ru, Rf )
.
= E
∫∞
T
Ru+Rf
p
e−r(θ−T )dθ + ζwU(l, φ, Ru) + ζfF(l, φ, Rf )
= Ψ(l, φ) + (ζw − 1)U(l, φ, Ru) + (ζf − 1)F(l, φ, Rf ),
where constants ζw ≥ 0 and ζf ≥ 0 are weights of the worker’s and the firm’s
welfare in the government’s preferences, respectively.
The objective function of Grossman and Helpman (1994a), (15), is widely
used in models of common agency and it has been justified as follows. The
politicians are mainly interested in their own income which consists of the
contributions from the public, Ru +Rf , but because they must defend their
position in general elections, they must sometimes take the utilities of the
interest groups U(l, φ, Ru) and F(l, φ, Rf ) into account directly. The linearity
of (15) in Ψ[Ru +Rf ] is assumed, for simplicity.
6 The political equilibrium
I assume for a while that the central planner can smoothly regulate unions’
and firms’ market power (α, ϕ). The results can then be extended for the
case where the central planner’s choices are more discrete.
Because the function `(α, φ) establishes one-to-one correspondence from
the central planner’s instrument α to l, one can in the model consider labor
devoted to R&D (= the measure of the growth rate, cf. subsection 3.2) l as a
policy variable. The unions’ and employers’ lobbies try to affect the central
planner by their contributions Ru and Rf . The contribution schedules are
therefore functions of the central planner’s policy variables:
Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ). (15)
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The central planner maximizes its utility function (15) by (l, φ), given
the contribution schedules (15) and the constraints (5) and (12). Following
proposition 1 of Dixit at al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for
this game is a set of contribution schedules Ru(l, φ) and Rf (l, φ) and policy
(l, φ) such that the following conditions (i)− (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Ru and Rf are non-negative but no more than the con-
tributor’s income.
(ii) The policy (φ, l) maximizes the central planner’s welfare (15) taking the
contribution schedules Ru and Rf as given,
(l, φ) ∈ arg max
(l,φ) s.t.
(5) and (12)
G(l, φ, Ru
(
l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
)
;
(iii) The worker lobby (employer lobby) cannot have a feasible strategy
Ru
(
l, φ) (Rf
(
l, φ)) that yields it a higher level of utility than in equi-
librium, given the central planner’s anticipated decision rule,
(l, φ) = argmax(l,φ) s.t. (5) and (12) U(l, φ, Ru(l, φ)
)
,
(l, φ) = argmax(l,φ) s.t. (5) and (12) F(l, φ, Rf (l, φ)
)
.
(iv) The worker lobby (employer lobby) provides the central planner at
least with the level of utility than in the case it offers nothing Ru = 0
(Rf = 0), and the central planner responds optimally given the other
lobby’s contribution function,
G
(
l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
)
≥ max(l,φ) s.t. (5) and (12)G(l, φ, Ru(l, φ), 0
)
,
G
(
l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ)
)
≥ max(l,φ) s.t. (5) and (12)G
(
l, φ, 0, Rf (l, φ)
)
.
Noting (15) and (16), the central planner’s utility function (15) changes into
G(l, φ) .= G(l, φ, Ru(l, φ), Rf (l, φ))
= Ψ(l, φ) + (ζw − 1)max(l,φ) s.t. (5) and (12) U(l, φ, Ru(l, φ))
+(ζf − 1)max(l,φ) s.t. (5) and (12)F(l, φ, Rf (l, φ)),
∂G/∂l = ∂Ψ/∂l, ∂G/∂φ = ∂Ψ/∂φ.
The Lagrangean for the maximization of the central planner’s utility func-
tion (16) by (l, φ) subject to the constraints (5) and (12) is given by
H = G(l, φ) + ε[L− l − n(l, φ)] + ϑ[`(1, φ)− l], (16)
10
where the multipliers ε and ϑ satisfy the conditions
ε[L− l − n(l, φ)] = 0, ε ≥ 0,
ϑ[`(1, φ)− l] = 0, ϑ ≥ 0. (17)
Noting (9), (12), (13), (16) and (16), the first-order conditions for the maxi-
mization of the central planner’s utility are the following:
∂H/∂φ = ∂G/∂φ− ε∂n/∂φ+ ϑ∂`/∂φ
= ∂Ψ/∂φ− ε∂n/∂φ+ ϑ∂`(1, φ)/∂φ = 0, (18)
∂H/∂l = ∂G/∂l − ε[1 + ∂n/∂l]− ϑ
= ∂Ψ/∂l − ε[1 + ∂n/∂l]− ϑ = 0. (19)
There are two possibilities in labor market regulation:
(a) If the labor market is deregulated, α → 0, then, by (12), there is full
employment L = l + n(l, φ). In that case, there cannot be monopoly
unions α = 1 that can dictate wages and, by (12), (17) and (18),
`(1, φ) > l, ϑ = 0, ε = ∂Ψ
∂l
/(1 + ∂n
∂l
) > 0 hold true.
(b) Otherwise, when α is sufficiently large, the labor market is regulated,
there is unemployment L > l + n(l, φ) and, by (12), (17) and (18),
ε = 0, ϑ = ∂Ψ
∂l
> 0, `(1, φ) = l and α = 1 hold true.
The central planner can increase its welfare either (a) by increasing the level
of income or (b) by speeding up growth. If (a) is more effective than (b),
then it eliminates union power altogether to have full employment. On the
other hand, if (b) is more effective than (a), then it supports labor unions to
promote cost-escaping R&D.
Appendix
A. The functions (9) and (9)
From (5) and (6) it follows that
pi
tj+1
j /pi
tj
j = B
tj+1
j /B
tj
j = a. (20)
The Bellman equation corresponding to (8) is given by [cf. Dixit and Pindyck
(1994), Wa¨lde (2007)]
rΩ(tj, wj) = maxlj
{
pij − wjlj + λl1−νj
[
Ω(tj + 1, wj, pij)− Ω(tj, wj, pij)
]}
.
(21)
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The first-order condition corresponding to this is given by
(1− ν)λl−νj
[
Ω(tj + 1, wj, pij)− Ω(tj, wj, pij)
]
= wj. (22)
I try the solution
Πj = cjpij, cj ∈ (0, 1), Ω = Πj/δj, (23)
in which dividends Πj is in fixed proportion cj to profits pij, and the subjective
discount factor δj > 0 is independent of income pij. Given (20) and (23), one
obtains
Ω˜
.
= Ω(tj + 1, wj, pij) = cjpi
tj+1
j /δj = acjpi
tj
j /δj = aΩ(tj, wj, pij). (24)
Inserting this and (23) into (21), one obtains
r = Πj/Ω + λl
1−ν
j
(
Ω˜/Ω− 1) = δj + (a− 1)λl1−νj
and
δj = r + (1− a)λl1−νj > 0. (25)
From (23) and (7) it follows that
wjlj = pij − Πj = (1/cj − 1)Πj = (1− cj)pij. (26)
Inserting (23), (24), (25) and (26) into (22), one obtains
(a− 1)(1− ν)λ = (1− ν)λ
(
Ω˜
Ω
− 1
)
=
wj
Ω
lνj
=
wjδj
Πj
lνj =
δj
lj
(
1
cj
− 1
)
lνj =
(
1
cj
− 1
)
δjl
ν−1
j
= [rlν−1j + (1− a)λ]1−cjcj .
Differentiating the logarithm of this equation totally yields
(ν − 1)rlν−2j dlj
rlν−1j + (1− a)λ
=
( 1
1− cj +
1
c j
)
dcj =
dcj
(1− cj)cj .
Noting (5), (23), (25), this equation defines the function
Πj
pij
= cj = c(lj) =
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
r+(1−a)λνl1−νj
> 0, 1− cj = (1−ν)(a−1)λl
1−ν
j
r+(1−a)λνl1−νj
,
c′ .= dcj
dlj
=
(ν−1)rlν−2j (1−cj)cj
rlν−1j +(1−a)λ
=
(
−︷ ︸︸ ︷
ν − 1)r
+︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− cj)cj /lj
r + (1− a)λl1−νj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0.
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From (27) it follows that
d
dlj
[ lj
1−c(lj)
]
= 1
1−cj +
ljc
′
(1−cj)2 =
1
1−cj +
(ν−1)rcj/(1−cj)
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
= 1
1−cj
[
1 +
(ν−1)rcj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
]
= 1
1−cj
[
1 + (ν−1)r
r+(1−a)λνl1−νj
]
= ν
1−cj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
r+(1−a)λνl1−νj
=
νcj
1−cj > 0.
Finally, noting (5), (26), (27) and (27), one obtains
nj =
(
1
φ
− 1
)
pij
wj
=
(1/φ−1)lj
1−cj =
(1/φ−1)lj
1−c(lj)
.
= n(lj, φ),
nj + lj =
1/φ−cj
1−cj lj,
∂(nj+lj)
∂lj
=
(
1
φ
− cj
)
d
dlj
[
lj
1−c(lj)
]
− c′lj
1−cj
=
[1
φ
− c(lj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
ν
c(lj)
1−c(lj) − c′(lj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
lj
1− c(lj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0.
Results (27)-(27) imply and (9) and (9).
B. The function (12)
Because there is one-to-one correspondence between the wage wj and
labor input in R&D, lj, through (5) and (9), in the maximization of the
Generalized Nash Product Uαj F 1−αj can be maximized by lj. Noting (5), I
obtain that both (nj + lj)wj and Πj = cjpij grow at the same rate as Bj.
The parties’ expected utilities (10) and (11) can then be transformed into
the following form [Aghion and Howitt (1998), p. 61]
U(lj, φ) =
Bj(T )(nj+lj)wj
Bj [r+(1−a)λl1−νj ]
, F (lj, φ) =
Bj(T )c(lj)pij
Bj [r+(1−a)λl1−νj ]
. (27)
Given (5), (9), (9) and (27), the outcome of bargaining is obtained through
maximizing by lj the following increasing transformation of U
α
j F1−αj :
Γj(lj, C, α)
.
= log
[
Uαj F
1−α
j
]
α log Uj + (1− α) log Fj
= α log
[
(nj + lj)wjB
−1
j
]
+ (1− α) log[c(lj)pijB−1j ]
− log[r + (1− a)λl1−νj ]+∆
= α log(1 + lj/nj) + log
[
wjnjB
−1
j
]
+(1− α) log c(lj)− log
[
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
+∆
= α log(1 + lj/nj) + log nj + (1− α) log c(lj)
− log[r + (1− a)λl1−νj ]+∆
= α log[1/φ− c(lj)] + log lj − log
[
1− c(lj)
]
+(1− α) log c(lj)− log
[
r + (1− a)λl1−νj
]
+∆
with r + (1− a)λl1−νj > 0,
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where ∆ denotes terms that are independent of lj, subject to the constraint
lj + n(lj, φ) ≤ L. The Lagrangean of this problem is given by
Lj = Γj(lj, C, α) + β[L− lj − n(lj, φ)], (28)
where the multiplier β satisfies the conditions
β[L− lj − n(lj, φ)] = 0, β ≥ 0. (29)
Noting (28), (28) and (29), the first-order condition is
∂Lj/∂lj = ∂Γj/∂lj − β[1 + ∂n/∂lj] = 0, (30)
where
∂Γj
∂lj
= 1
lj
+
c′(lj)
1−c(lj) + (1− α)
c′(lj)
c(lj)
− αc′(lj)
1/φ−c(lj)
+
(1−ν)(a−1)λl−νj
r+(1−a)λlj l1−νj
.
(31)
which defines the function
lj = `(α, φ) for lj + nj < L. (32)
Noting
∂2Γj
∂lj∂α
= − c′
c
− c′
1/φ−c > 0,
∂2Γj
∂lj∂φ
= − αc′
(1−φc)2 > 0,
and the second-order condition ∂2Γj/∂l
2
j < 0 for lj + nj < L, one obtains
∂`
∂α
= − ∂2Γj
∂lj∂α
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
> 0 and
∂`
∂φ
= − ∂2Γj
∂lj∂φ
/
∂2Γj
∂l2j
> 0 for lj + nj < L.
(33)
From (9), (28), (29), (30) and (31) it follows that
limα→0
∂Γj
∂lj
= 1
lj
+ c
′
1−c +
c′
c
+
(1−ν)(a−1)λl−νj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
= 1
lj
+ c
′/c
1−c +
(1−ν)(a−1)λl−νj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
= c
′/c
1−c +
1
lj
r+(1−a)νλl1−νj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
=
(ν−1)r/lj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
+ 1
lj
r+(1−a)νλl1−νj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
= ν
lj
r+(1−a)λl−νj
r+(1−a)λl1−νj
= ν
lj
> 0,(
limα→0 β
)
limα→0
(
1 +
∂n
∂lj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
= limα→0
∂Γj
∂lj
> 0,
limα→0 β > 0, limα→0(L− lj − nj) = 0.
Results (32), (33) and (34) imply (12).
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7 Conclusions
This paper examines an economy with a large number of industries, each
producing a different good. Technological change follows a Poisson process
where firms improve their productivity through investment in R&D. The less
there are firms in the economy or the more they can coordinate their actions,
the higher their profits. Labor is used in production or R&D. All workers are
unionized and their wages depend on relative union bargaining power. If this
power is high enough, then there is involuntary unemployment. Both workers
and firms lobby the central planner of the economy which affects firms’ and
unions’ market power. The main findings of the paper can be summarized
the follows. Unions’ and firms’ market power decreases the level of income at
each moment of time. On the other hand, the greater the firm’s share of value
added or the higher union wages, more incentives the firm has to increase the
productivity of labor through R&D. In this respect, there can be an optimal
amount of unions’ and firms’ market power. Concerning the regulation of
relative union bargaining power, the central planner can increase its welfare
either (a) by increasing the level of income or (b) by speeding up economic
growth. If (a) is more effective than (b), then the central planner eliminates
union power altogether to have full employment. On the other hand, if (b)
is more effective than (a), then the central planner supports labor unions to
promote cost-escaping R&D.
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